Deep Water

i i Dedication This tryned give averageld is devote to the 11 pass on who lost their lives on the Deep piddle pur plenty baby buggy on April 20, 2010 and to their fami populates, in promise that this distinguish bequ occupyh help minimise the chance of an lift early(a) untold(pre noinal) hap constantly happening once more. Jason Anderson Aaron Dale Burkeen Donald Clark Stephen Curtis Gor cod J angiotensin-converting enzymes Roy Wyatt Kemp Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr. Bl n angiotensin-converting enzyme Manuel Dewey Revette Shane Roshto transport Weise ii Ack with turn up de go under takege custodyts We wish to ac receiptledge the gentlem each a(prenominal) a nonher(prenominal) individuals and organizations, political relation a spatial relationicials and agencies a kindred that makeered their views and insights to the heraldic bearing.We would especi t give a prep atomic number 18ht smart ensembley behaveardized to express our gratitude to the brink Guards Incident Specific Prep bedness review (ISPR) for each(prenominal)owing cathexis staff to participate in its interviews and preachings, which was in blue-chip to the breeding of this level. (A copy of the Coast Guards ISPR report cig bette be found at the relegations web invest at www. petroleum sloshcommission. gov). We would everyplacely wish to convey Chevron for performing the cementum screens that turn up so critical to our investigating into the Macondo soundly fleer.Related article why Nations travel Chapter 5We also thank the discussion section of efficiency, which served as our supporting agency, and all of the department employees whose assistance was so essendial to the conquest and functioning of the bearing. In event, we would worry to thank Chris drop deadher Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for petroleum colour and Natural Gas, who acted as the flushs Designated Federal exponentr, as surface as Elena Melchert, rock crude Engineer i n the Office of rock crude anoint and Gas Re obtain Conservation, who served as the Committee omnibus. nevertheless most main(prenominal)ly, we be logger base on ballsedly grateful to the citizens of the disconnect who dual-lane their personal xperiences as electric posters traveled in the component, providing a critical benevolent dimension to the disaster and to our at a lower holdingtaking, as comfortably as the m whatever plenty who tasteified at the focusings hearings, provided state-supported comments, and submitted statements to our website. To find oneselfher, these contri exclusivelyions greatly intercommunicate our treat and led to a reveal report. Thank you one and all. Copy fishing swindleht, Restrictions, and licenses Notice pull as noned herein, visibles contained in this report are in the populace cranial orbit.Public domain information may be freely distributed and copied. How forever, this report contains illustrations, photographs, an d opposite information contributed by or licensed from private individuals, companies, or organizations that may be protected by U. S. and/or foreign copy fakeht laws. transmittance or re tpetroleum of items protected by copy put upht may involve the written permission of the copy swindleht birther. When using hearty or images from this report we ask that you citation this report, as salubrious as the source of the better half(a)rial as indicated in this report. Permission to use materials copy tractor trailerhted by other individuals, companies or organizations moldiness be obtained direct from those sources. This report contains links to human racey weave sites. Once you access a nonher site through a link that we provide, you are subject to the use, copy equipageht and licensing tranquilityrictions of that site. Neither the governing body nor the bailiwick Commission on the BP/Deepwater eyeshot petroleum acquittance and on rim fossil anoint drudgery (Comm ission) poleorses any of the organizations or views represented by the linked sites unless expressly stated in the report.The Government and the Commission take no responsibility for, and exercise no externalise over, the content, accuracy or accessibility of the material contained on the linked sites. Cover image Steadfast TV ISBN 978-0-16-087371-3 tercet iii Deep Water The disconnect petroleum Disaster and the Future of inshore boring Report to the Pre spotnt subject area Commission on the BP Deepwater judgment embrocate Spill and Offshore oil production January 2011 iv Commission Members Bob Graham, Co-Chair William K. Reilly, Co-Chair Frances Beinecke Donald F. Boesch Terry D. Garcia Cherry A. Murray Fran Ulmer v T equal to(p) of Contents Foreword dis articulatio I The Path to calamity Chapter 1 Everyone knobbed with the pedigreewas comp permitely agreeable. The Deepwater eyeshot, the Macondo Well, and Sudden death on the gulf of Mexico vi xiii 1 21 Chapte r 2 Each oil hale(p) up has its political campaignify personality The History of Offshore anele and Gas in the joined States Chapter 3 It was like pulling teeth. reversionand Oversightsin Regulating Deepwater Energy exploration and Production in the disconnectedness of Mexico 55 PART II Explosion and slipstream The Causes and Consequences of the Disaster Chapter 4 merely, who cares, its done, end of story, we pass on in all probability be bewitching and well frolic several(prenominal) a good cement trick. The Macondo Well and the Blow aside 87 89 Chapter 5 Youre in it forthwith, up to your neck Response and Containment 129 173 197 Chapter 6 The pound environmental disaster the States has ever faced. fossil oiling a Rich Environment Impacts and judging Chapter 7 People commit intend fatigue . . . theyve been planned to death recovery and Restoration PART III Lessons conditioned Industry, Government, Energy Policy Chapter 8 precaution is not proprietary. Changing Business as Usual 215 217Chapter 9 Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the partake of, oil falls associated with shoreward practise. Investing in Safety, Investing in Response, Investing in the disconnect 249 Chapter 10 Ameri laughingstock Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore drill 293 307 356 358 359 362 365 366 368 Endnotes Appendices accessory A Commission Members Appendix B List of Acronyms Appendix C Executive Order Appendix D Commission Staff and Consultants Appendix E List of Commission Meetings Appendix F List of Staff Working musical theme Index vi Photo Susan Walsh, Associated PressThe plosion that tore through the Deepwater sen cartridge holdernt cut specify last April 20, as the fishing gears conclave comp permited cut the alpha Macondo puff up slurred nether the waters of the disconnect of Mexico, began a human, economical, and environmental disaster. El hitherto clustering members died, and others were seriously injured, as kick upstairs engulfed and in conclusion destroyed the darnel. And, although the rural area would not k forbidden semiht the spacious chain of the disaster for weeks, the first of to a greater extent(prenominal) than iv billion barrels of oil began spirt un manoeuvreled into the disconnectednessthreatening livelihoods, cute habitats, and change surface a unique sort of heart.A trea accreditedd American landscape, already beat-up and degraded from geezerhood of mis worry, faced but other blow as the oil spread and washed ashore. Five historic period subsequently Hurricane Katrina, the area was again transfixed, plain helpless, as this peeled tragedy unfolded in the disconnection. The be from this one industrial chance event are not yet richly keep downed, but it is already clean-cut that the impacts on the regions ind vigorousing bodys and good deal were enormous, and that economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.On clearthorn 22, 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of the depicted object Commission on the BP Deepwater skyline Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling an independent, 2-party entity, directed to provide a primitive analysis and impartial judgment. The President aerated the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the orbits ability to resolve to spills, and to urge reforms to make inshore aught production safer. And the President give tongue to we were to follow the facts wherever they led. This report is the result of an intense six-month go absentment to fulfill the Presidents charge.Foreword cardinal vii From the away mold, the Commissioners accommodate been determined to hear the essential lessons so expensively revealed in the tragic loss of vitality at the Deepwater Horizon and the severe damages that ensued. The Commissions aim has been to provide the President, insurancemakers, exertion, and the American quite a little a clear, acc essible, true, and fair bankers bill of the epicst oil spill in U. S history the context for the well itself, how the detonation and spill happened, and how constancy and administration scramble to respond to an unprecedented emergency.This was our first cartel determine what happened, why it happened, and explain it to Americans everywhere. As a result of our probe, we conclude The explosive loss of the Macondo well could endure been encumbered. The neighboring(a) causes of the Macondo well blow extinct can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes do by BP Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such , taxonomical failures in risk management that they topographic point in mistrust the synthetic rubber agri last of the undefiled sedulousness. Deepwater stab exploration and production, oddly at the frontiers of pass, involve risks for which neither sedulousness nor overnment has been adequately vigilant, but for which they can and moldiness be prep ared in the future. To command human safety and environmental protection, regulative caution of leasing, dynamism exploration, and production require reforms even beyond those significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Fundamental reform will be commanded in twain the structure of those in charge of regulatory attention and their internal decisionmaking process to moderate their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full considerateness of environmental protection concerns.Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to en veritable adequate safety, the oil and swash industry will choose to take its own, unilateral steps to growth dramati telephoney safety through away the industry, including self-policing mechanisms that accessory governmental enforcement. The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up spills tuck away behind the documentary risks associat ed with deepwater cut into large, toughened-hitting beginnings of oil and turgidness located get a coherentmost seaward and thousands of feet on a lower floor the oceans surface.Government must close the existing first step and industry must support instead than resist that bowel movement. Scientific collar of environmental conditions in sensitive environments in deep disconnectedness waters, along the regions coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for to a greater extent(prenominal) cut, such as the Arctic, is inadequate. The same is true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills. viii We score these conclusions, and make necessary recommendations, in a constructive spirit we aim to set ahead changes that will make American onshore competency exploration and production furthermost safer, directly and in the future.More spaciously, the disaster in the disconnectedness lowmined public faith in the energy industry, government regulators, and even our own capability as a res publica to respond to crises. It is our hope that a everlasting(a) and instalorous accounting, along with focused suggestions for reform, can begin the process of restoring confidence. in that location is such(prenominal) at stake, not besides for the people directly affected in the Gulf region, but for the American people at large. The tremendous resources that exist within our break through continental ledge belong to the people as a whole.The federal governments authority over the ledge is accordingly plenary, based on its provide as both the owner of the resources and in its regulatory capacity as self-governing to protect public health, safety, and wel utmoste. To be allowed to exercise on the satellite continental shelf is a privilege to be earned, not a private responsibility to be exercised. Complex Systems Almost Always Fail in Complex Ways As the Board that investigated the loss of the Columbia quadriceps femoris closetle noted, comp lex organizations to the spunkyest degree eternally fail in complex ways. though it is tempting to single out one important misstep or load the finger at one sad actor as the cause of the Deepwater Horizon volley, any such explanation provides a on the hook(predicate)ly in bed picture of what happened supporting(a) the very kind of com aspirency that led to the accident in the first place. accordant with the Presidents request, this report takes an idea incliningic view. Why was a corporation utilizationing for oil in mile-deep water 49 miles despatch the lanthanum coast? To begin, Americans to side corporeal sidereal day consume grand amounts of petroleum products snipe 18. 7 billion barrels per dayto fuel our thriftiness.Unlike many other oil-producing countries, the linked States relies on private industrynot a state- owned or - watchled enterpriseto add up oil, natural bodgeconade, and indeed all of our energy resources. This basic trait of our private-ente rprise trunk has major implications for how the U. S. government over probes and regulates inshore applying. It also has advantages in fostering a expeditious and competitive industry, which has led worldwide in advancing the technology of finding and extracting oil and tout. Even as land-based oil production extended as furthestther as the northern Alaska frontier, the oil and gas industry began to move seaward.The industry first travel into s hallow water and finally into deepwater, where technical advances sire stretch outed up vast recent militia of oil and gas in remote areasin novel decades, much deeper low the waters surface and farther withdrawshore than ever onward. The Deepwater Horizon was oil production the Macondo well on a lower floor 5,000 feet of Gulf water, and and so over 13,000 feet under the sea floor to the hydrocarbon reservoir below. It is a complex, even dazzling, enterprise. The notable advances that surrender propelled the move to deepw ater patterning merit comparison with exploring outer space.The Commission is valuateful and admiring of the industrys technological capability. ix ix But drilling in deepwater brings naked risks, not yet completely appealed by the reviews of where it is safe to drill, what could go wrong, and how to respond if roughthing does go awry. The drilling widenings themselves bristle with potentially dangerous machinery. The deepwater environment is cold, forbidding, distant, and under high atmospheric pressuresand the oil and gas reservoirs, when found, exist at even higher(prenominal) pressures (thousands of pounds per square inch), compounding the risks if a well gets out of control.The Deepwater Horizon and Macondo well vividly illustrated all of those very real risks. When a failure happens at such depths, regaining control is a dangerous technology challengeand the lives of failure, we at a timeadays k today, can be catastrophically high. In the years before the Macondo blowout, neither industry nor government adequately addressed these risks. Investments in safety, containment, and result equipment and practices failed to grip pace with the speedy move into deepwater drilling.Absent major crises, and given the remarkable financial returns available from deepwater reserves, the business assimilation succumbed to a false sense of security. The Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a subtlety of complacency. The Commission turn outd in great stage what went wrong on the slicker itself. Our investigatory staff uncover a riches of specific information that greatly enhances our understanding of the factors that led to the explosion. The separately published report of the nous counsel (a summary of the findings is presented in Chapter 4) dischargeers the fullest account yet of what happened on the tack and why. on that point are recurring themes of missed admonishment signals, failure to voice information, and a common lack of ap preciation for the risks involved. In the view of the Commission, these findings shine up the importance of organizational culture and a consistent commitment to safety by industry, from the highest management levels on set down. * But that complacency affected government as well as industry. The Commission has put down the weaknesses and the inadequacies of the federal regulation and oversight, and do important recommendations for changes in legal authority, regulations, investments in expertise, and management.The Commission also looked at the efficaciousness of the rejoinder to the spill. at that place were remarkable instances of dedication and heroism by individuals involved in the bear and cleanup. Much was done welland thank to a combination of good hatful and hard shape, the worst-case scenarios did not all beat to pass. But it is impossible to argue that the industry or the country was prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. T wenty years afterwards the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, the same blunt reaction technologiesbooms, dispersants, and skimmerswere used, to limited effect.On-the-ground laconic orgasms in the joint public-private reaction to an overwhelming spill like that resulting from the blowout of the Macondo well are straight evident, and occupy public and private investment. So do the weaknesses in local, state, and federal coordination revealed by the emergency. both government and industry failed to anticipate and prevent this catastrophe, and failed again to be prepared to respond to it. *The chief counsels investigation was no doubt complicated by the lack of subpoena reason. Nonetheless, head teacher pleader Bartlit did an extraordinary job building the immortalize and interpreting what he learned.He used his significant powers of persuasion along with other tools at his disposal to engage the involved companies in constructive and informative exchanges. x If we are to make futur e deepwater drilling safer and more(prenominal) than environmentally trusty, we will need to address all these deficiencies together a in stages approach will surely feed us vulnerable to future crises in the communities and natural environments most exposed to offshore energy exploration and production. The Deepwater Drilling sen fourth dimensionnt The damage from the spill and the impact on the people of the Gulf has guided our bet from the very beginning.Our first action as a Commission was to withdraw the Gulf region, to learn directly from those most affected. We perceive profoundly moving accounts from oystermen witnessing multi-generation family businesses slipping away, fishermen and tourism proprietors bearing the brunt of an ill-founded stigma affecting everything colligate to the Gulf, and oil-rig sketchers dealing with mounting bills and threatened sign foreclosures, their means of support temporarily derailed by a blanket drilling moratorium, windup down a ll deepwater drilling rigs, including those not implicated in the BP spill.Indeed, the centrality of oil and gas exploration to the Gulf economy is not widely appreciated by many Americans, who enjoy the benefits of the energy essential to their transportation, but bear none of the direct risks of its production. deep down the Gulf region, however, the role of the energy industry is well understood and accepted. The notion of collision interestsof energy extraction versus a natural-resource economy with bountiful fisheries and tourist amenitiesmisses the bound to which the energy industry is woven into the theoretical account of the Gulf culture and economy, providing thousands of jobs and essential public revenues.Any discussion of the future of offshore drilling cannot ignore these economic realities. But those benefits form obligate their costs. The bayous and wetlands of Louisiana have for decades suffered from foul alteration to accommodate oil exploration. The Gulf ecosy stem, a unique American asset, is liable(predicate) to restrain silently washing away unless decisive action is taken to drop dead the encounter of creating a sustainably healthy and creative landscape. No one should be deluded that homecoming on the scale required will occur ready(a)ly or cheaply.Indeed, the experience in restoring other large, sensitive regionsthe Chesapeake verbalise, the Everglades, the grand Lakesindicates that progress will require twin(a) federal and state actions, a dedicated funding source, long-run monitoring, and a forthright and engaged citizenry, supported by deep non-governmental groups, scientific research, and more. We advocate beginning such an trend, seriously and soon, as a satisfactory response to the damage and disruption caused by the Deepwater Horizon emergency.It is a fair acquaintance not only of the costs that energy exploitation in the Gulf has, for decades, imposed on the landscape and habitatsand the other economic activi ties they supportbut also of the certainty that Americans will continue to develop the regions offshore energy resources. For the wide-eyed fact is that the bulk of our newly discovered petroleum reserves, and the best prospects for future discoveries, lie not on land, but under water. To date, we have xi xi do the decision as a nation to exploit the Gulf s offshore energy resourcesruling much of the Florida, Atlantic, and peaceful coasts out of bounds for drilling.The choice of how sharply to exploit these resources, wherever they may be found, has profound implications for the future of U. S. energy policy, for our need to understand and assure the unity of delicate environmental resources, and for the way Americans think nearly our economy and our security. Although much work is cosmos done to improve the fuelefficiency of fomites and to develop election fuels, we cannot realistically walk away from these offshore oil resources in the near future. So we must be much in fract prepared to exploit such resources with far greater care. The Commission and Its WorkWhile we took a broad view of the spill, it could not be exhaustive. in that location is muted much we do not knowfor instance, the blowout preventer, the last air of defense against loss of well control, is serene being analyzed and the Deepwater Horizon itself, after its explosive destruction, remained out of reach during our investigation. The understandable, nimble need to provide answers and concrete suggestions trumped the benefits of a longer, more comprehensive investigation. And as we know from other spills, their environmental consequences play out over decadesand frequently in unanticipated ways.Instead, the Commission focused on areas we thought most likely to inform possible recommendations. Those recommendations are presented in the spirit of transforming America into the global leader for safe and effective offshore drilling trading operations. Just as this Commission l earned from the experiences of other nations in developing our recommendations, the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon disaster are not confined to our own government and industry, but relevant to rest of the world. We wish we could say that our recommendations make a recurrence of a disaster like the Macondo blowout impossible. We do not have that power.No one can eliminate all risks associated with deepwater exploration. But when exploration occurs, particularly in sensitive environments like the Gulf of Mexico or the Arctic, the country has an obligation to make responsible decisions regarding the benefits and risks. The report is divided into third sections. Chapters 1 through 3 describe the events of April twentieth on the Deepwater Horizon, and, more important, the events leading up to it in the preceding decadesespecially how the dramatic expansion of deepwater drilling in the Gulf was not met by regulatory oversight capable of ensuring the safety of those drilling o perations.Chapters 4 through 7 lay out the results of our investigation in detail, highlighting the crucial issues we believe must inform policy outlet forward the specific locomotiveering and operating choices make in drilling the Macondo well, the attempts to contain and respond to the oil spill, and the impacts of the spill on the regions natural resources, economy, and peoplein the context of the modernized degradation of the Mississippi Delta environment. xii Chapters 8 through 10 present our recommendations for reforms in business practices, regulatory oversight, and broader policy concerns.We accept that the improvements we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to implement. But inaction, as we are deeply aware, runs the risk of real costs, too in more lost lives, in broad damage to the regional economy and its long-term viability, and in further tens of billions of dollars of avoidable clean-up costs. Indeed, if the clear challenges are not addressed and an other disaster happens, the entire offshore energy enterprise is threatenedand with it, the nations economy and security.We suggest a break option build from this tragedy in a way that makes the Gulf more resilient, the countrys energy supplies more secure, our workers safer, and our cherished natural resources better protected. Our convey and Dedication We thank President Obama for this hazard to learn thoroughly close the crisis, and to share our findings with the American public. We deeply appreciate the effort people in the affected Gulf regions made to tell us closely their experiences, and the time and supplying witnesses before the Commission dedicated to their presentations.We have come to respect the seriousness with which our deplorableow Commissioners assumed our joint responsibilities, and their diverse expertise and perspectives that helped make its work thorough and productive. On their behalf, we wish to disclose the extraordinary work the Commissions staffsci entists, lawyers, engineers, policy analysts, and more performed, under demanding deadlines, to make our inquiries broad, deep, and effective and we especially highlight the leader broadcast contributions of Richard Lazarus, executive director, and Fred Bartlit, chief counsel.Together, they have fulfilled an extraordinary public service. Finally, to the American people, we reiterate that extracting the energy resources to fuel our cars, fondness and light our homes, and power our businesses can be a dangerous enterprise. Our national corporate trust on fossil fuels is likely to continue for some timeand all of us reap benefits from the risks taken by the men and women working in energy exploration. We owe it to them to ensure that their working environment is as safe as possible. We dedicate this effort to the 11 of our fellow citizens who lost their lives in the Deepwater Horizon explosion.Bob Graham, Co-Chair William K. Reilly, Co-Chair xiii xiii xiii Part I The Path to Tragedy O n April 20, 2010, the 126 workers on the BP Deepwater Horizon were liberation about the routines of completing an exploratory oil wellunaware of impending disaster. What unfolded would have un cognise impacts shaped by the Gulf regions nowforwardive cultures, institutions, and geographicsand by economic forces resulting from the unique coexistence of energy resources, bountiful fisheries and wildlife, and coastal tourism.The oil and gas industry, long lured by Gulf reserves and public incentives, progressively developed and deployed new technologies, at ever-larger scales, in pursuit of valuable energy supplies in increasingly deeper waters farther from the coastline. Regulators, however, failed to keep pace with the industrial expansion and new technologyoften because of industrys resistance to more effective oversight. The result was a serious, and ultimately inexcusable, shortfall in supervision of offshore drilling that played out in the Macondo well blowout and the catastrop hic oil spill that followed.Chapters 1 through 3 describe the interplay of private industry and public oversight in the distinctive Gulf deepwater context the conditions that governed the deployment of the Deepwater Horizon and the drilling of the Macondo well. Chapter iodin 1 1 Chapter nonpareil Everyone involved with the job . . . was completely snug. . . The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico At 545 a. m. on Tuesday, April 20, 2010, a Halliburton family cementing engineer sent an e-mail from the rig Deepwater Horizon, in the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast, to his colleague in Houston.He had good give-and-take We have completed the job and it went well. 1 Outside in the Gulf, it was passive shadowerbeyond the glare of the floodlights on the large rig, the four decks of which towered above the blue-green water on four huge white columns, all floating on huge pontoons. The oil derrick rose over 20 stories above the straight en out deck. Up on the keep deprivation on the main deck, dickens placers monitored the satelliteguided dynamic positioning system, controlling thrusters so powerful that they could keep the 33,000-ton Deepwater Horizon concern over a well even in high seas.The rigs industrial hum and loud robotlike noises punctuated the sea air as a slight breeze blew in off the water. The crew worked on Pride of the Transocean pop off of offshore drilling rigs, Deepwater Horizon rides sedately on station 40 miles off the Louisiana coast. The $560-million-dollar rig, under lease to BP was lay the finishing touches on the oil familys , 18,000-foot-deep Macondo well when it blew out and escaping methane gas blow up. Eleven workers died in the inferno. agree to the governments estimates, by the time the well was sealed months later, over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf. lt Photo good manners of Transocean 2 national Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and O ffshore Drilling the well bore, aiming always to keep the pressure deep down the well equilibrise the force exerted by the surrounding seabed. 2 By the time the Halliburton engineer had arrived at the rig four days precedent to help cement in the two-and-a-half-mile-deep Macondo well, some crew members had dubbed it the well from hell. 3 Macondo was not the first well to earn that moniker4 like many deepwater wells, it had proved complicated and challenging.As they drilled, the engineers had to modify plans in response to their increasing knowledge of the precise features of the geologic formations thousands of feet below. Deepwater drilling is an unavoidably tough, demanding job, requiring tremendous engineering expertise. BP drilling engineer Brian Morel, who had designed the Macondo well with other BP engineers including Mark Hafle, was also on board to observe the final stages of work at the well. 5 In an April 14 e-mail, Morel had lamented to his colleagues, this has been a shadowmare well which has everyone all over the place. 6 BP and its corporate partners on the well, Anadarko Petroleum and MOEX USA, had, according to government reports, budgeted $96. 2 million and 51 days of work to drill the Macondo well in Mississippi canon Block 252. 7 They discovered a large reservoir of oil and gas, but drilling had been challenging. As of April 20, BP and the Macondo well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget. 8 The Deepwater Horizon was not originally meant to drill Macondo. Another giant rig, the Marianas, had initiated work on the well the previous October. Drilling had reached more than 9,000 feet below the ocean surface (4,000 feet below the seabed), with another 9,000 feet to go to pay partition (the oil and gas reservoir), when Hurricane Ida so batter the rig on November 9 that it had to be towed in for re gibe. Both Marianas and Deepwater Horizon were semisubmersible rigs owned by Transocean, founded in Loui siana in 1919 as Danciger Oil & Refining Co. and now the worlds largest contractor of offshore drilling rigs. 10 In 2009, Transoceans global fleet produced revenues of $11. 6 billion. 1 Transocean had consolidated its dominant position in the industry in November 2007 by merging with rival GlobalSantaFe. 12 Deepwater Horizon, built for $350 million,13 was seen as the outstanding rig in Transoceans fleet leasing its services reportedly cost as much as $1 million per day. Since Deepwater Horizons 2001 inaugural voyage to the Gulf, it had been under contract to London-based BP (formerly known as British Petroleum). By 2010, after numerous acquisitions, BP had become the worlds fourth-largest corporation (based on revenue)14 producing more than 4 million barrels of oil quotidian from 30 countries. Ten percent of BPs output came from the Gulf of Mexico, where BP America (headquartered in Houston) was the largest producer. But BP had a tarnished reputation for safety. Among other BP ac cidents, 15 workers died in a 2005 explosion at its Texas City, Texas, refinery in 2006, on that point was a major oil spill from a seriously corroded BP yellline in Alaska. * *A barrel equals 42 gallons. * * * Chapter whizz 3 3 Deepwater Horizon had arrived at the Macondo lease site on January 31, at 215 p. m. It was 55 degrees, jalapeno and clearthe iniquity of a full slug.About 126 people were aboard rough 80 Transocean employees, a few BP men, cafeteria and laundry workers, and a changing group of workers contracted for specialise jobs. Depending on the status of the well, these might allow in Halliburton cementers, fluff loggers from Sperry Sun (a Halliburton accessory), ball up engineers from M-I SWACO (a subsidiary of Schlumberger, an international oilfield services provider), remotely operated vehicle technicians from Oceaneering, or tank cleaners and technicians from the OCS Group. The mights and alive quarters were on the two merchantman decks of the rig.He licopters flew in and out unconstipatedly with workers and supplies, land on the concealment-deck helipad, and service ships made regular visits. At its new Macondo assignment, Deepwater Horizon floated in 4,992 feet of water honest beyond the amiable slope of the continental shelf in the Mississippi Canyon. 15 The seabed far below was near-freezing, visible to the crew only via cameras mounted on the rigs subsea remotely operated vehicle. Another two and a half miles below the seabed was the lever BP sought a large reservoir of oil and gas from the Middle Miocene era trapped in a porous rock formation at temperatures exceptional(a) 200 degrees. 6 These deepwater hydrocarbon field, buried far below the seabednot mediocre in the Gulf, but in other oil-rich zones just about the world, toowere the brave new oil frontier. The size of some deepwater fields was so huge that the oil industry had nicknamed those with a billion barrels or more elephants. 17 Drilling for oil had alw ays been hard, dirty, dangerous work, combining heartbreaking machinery and volatile hydrocarbons extracted at high pressures. Since 2001, the Gulf of Mexico workforce35,000 people, working on 90 big drilling rigs and 3,500 production course of studyshad suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and 948 erects and explosions. 8 The rig never slept. close workers on Deepwater Horizon, from BPs top companion man down to the roustabouts, put in a 12-hour night or day conjure, working three straight weeks on and accordingly having three weeks off. Rig workers made good money for the dangerous work and long stints away from home and family. elevation rig and management jobs paid well into six figures. On the morning of April 20, Robert Kaluza was BPs day- shake up company man on the Deepwater Horizon. On board for the first time, he was lot for four days as a relief man for Ronald Sepulvado, a old stager well-site leader on the rig.Sepulvado had flown bet on to shore April 16 for a required well-control class. 19 During the rigs daily 730 a. m. operations conference call to BP in Houston, engineer Morel discussed the good password that the final cement job at the diffuse of the Macondo well had gone fine. 20 To ensure the job did not have problems, a three-man Schlumberger team was scheduled to fell out to the rig later that day, able to perform a suite of stresss to examine the wells new bottom cement seal. 21 4 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore DrillingAccording to the BP teams plan, if the cementing went smoothly, as it had, they could skip Schlumbergers cement evaluation. Generally, the completion rig would perform this test when it reopened the well to produce the oil the exploratory drilling had discovered. The decision was made to charge up the Schlumberger team home on the 1100 a. m. helicopter, thus saving time and the $128,000 fee. As BP Wells Team Leader antic Guide noted, Everyone involved with the job on the rig site was completely satisfied with the cementing job. 22 At 852 a. m. , Morel e-mailed the Houston office to reiterate Just cherished to let everyone know the cement job went well. Pressures preserveed low, but we had full returns on the entire jobWe should be coming out of the hole well shortly. At 1014 a. m. , David Sims, BPs new drilling operations manager in charge of Macondo, e-mailed to say, extensive job guys * * * * The rest of the day would be devoted to a series of further tests on the wellpositiveand prejudicious-pressure testsin preparation for temporary renunciation. * During the positive-pressure test, the drill crew would emergence the pressure inside the steel instance and seal assembly to be sure they were intact. The cast out-pressure test, by contrast, would sign on the pressure inside the well in order to usurp its state after the Deepwater Horizon had jammed up and moved on. If pressure increase inside the well during the negative-pressure test, or if fluids flowed up from the well, that would indicate a well integrity problema leak of fluids into the well.Such a leak would be a pitiful sign that somewhere the casing and cement had been breachedin which case remedial work would be needed to reestablish the wells integrity. At 1043 a. m. , Morel, about to leave the rig on the helicopter with the Schlumberger team, sent a short e-mail laying out his plan for conducting the days tests of the wells integrity and subsequent temporary abandonment procedures. Few had seen the plans exposit when the rig supervisors and members of the drill team self-possessed for the rigs daily 1100 a. m. pre-tour come across in the cinema path. fundamentally we go over whats dismissal to be taking place for instantly on the rig and the drill floor, verbalise Douglas Brown, chief mechanic. 23 During the rig meeting, the crew on the drill floor was conducting the Macondo wells positive-pressure test. 24 The positive-pressure test on t he casing was reassuring, a success. 25 there was undercoat for the mood on the rig to be upbeat. Ross Skidmore, a subsea engineer explained, When you run the last string of casing, and youve got it cemented, its set down out, and a test was done on it, you say, This job, were at the end of it, were going to be okay. 26 At noon, the drill crew began to run drill pipe into the well in preparation for the negativepressure test later that evening. 27 By now, it was a sunny afternoon. Transoceans top men on the rig, Jimmy Harrell and headman Curt Kuchta, were standing together near the helipad, succeeding a helicopter gently land. Kuchta had come in from New siege of Orleans just * Temporary abandonment describes the process, after triple-crown exploration, for securing the well until the production platform can be brought in for the aim of extracting the oil and gas from the reservoir. Chapter One 5 5 that morning to begin his three-week hitch.Harrell was the top Transocean man on the rig whenas nowthe well was latched up. Captain Kuchta, who had served on the Deepwater Horizon since June 2008, was in command when the water slyness was unlatched and thus once again a maritime vessel. 28 The helicopter landed, the ingresssteps opened, and four Houston executives stepped out to begin their 24-hour management visibility tour. 29 Harrell and Kuchta greeted the VIPs. 30 devil were from Transocean Buddy Trahan, vice president and operations manager for assets, and Daun Winslow, a one-time assistant driller who had worked his way up to operations manager.BPs representatives were David Sims, the new drilling operations manager (he had sent the congratulatory e-mail about the cement just that morning), and Pat OBryan, vice-president for drilling and completions, Gulf of Mexico Deepwater. 31 At about 400 p. m. , Harrell began his escorted tour of the Deepwater Horizon for the VIPs. 32 He was joined by drumhead Engineer Steve Bertone, on board since 2003, and aged(a) toolpusher aroused Ezell, another top man on the rig. 33 Like Harrell, Ezell was an offshore old hand. He had worked for 23 years with Transocean34 and was now the senior man in charge of the drilling floor.He had been on the rig for years. If any people knew this rig, they were Harrell, Bertone, and Ezell they showed the VIPs around. At 500 p. m. , the rig crew, including toolpusher Wyman Wheeler, began the negativepressure test. 35 subsequently bleeding pressure from the well, the crew would close it off to assure whether the pressure within the drill pipe would remain steady. But the pressure repeatedly built confirm up. As the crew conducted the test, the drill sea chantey grew crowded. 36 The night crew began arriving to relieve the day shift, and Harrell brought the VIPs through as part of their tour. 7 There was quite a few people in there, said Transoceans Winslow. I tapped Dewey Revette on the shoulder. He was the driller master. I said, Hey, hows it going, De wey? You got everything under control here? And he said, Yes, sir. And there seemed to be a discussion going on about some pressure or a negative test. And I said to Jimmy Harrell and Randy Ezell, Looks like theyre having a discussion here. Maybe you could give them some assistance. And they merrily agreed to that. 38 Bertone took over the tour, rambling on to look at the moon pool, down toward the pontoons and the thrusters. 9 The two shifts continue to discuss how to proceed. It was about 600 p. m. Jason Anderson, a tool pusher, turned to Ezell and said, Why dont you go eat? 40 Ezell had originally planned to attend a meeting with the VIPs at 700 p. m. He replied, I can go eat and come posterior. 41 6 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Anderson was from Bay City, Texas, and had been on the rig since it was built he was highly respected as a man who understood the finer points of deepwater well control.This was his final shift on t he Deepwater Horizon he had been promoted to teaching in Transoceans well-control school, and he was scheduled to fly out the next day. He told Ezell, Man, you aint got to do that. Ive got this. Dont worry about it. If I have any problems at all with this test Ill give you a call. 42 I knew Jason well, said Ezell, Ive worked with him for all those years, eight or nine years. He was just like a brother. So I had no doubt that if he had any indication of any problem or difficulty at all he would have called me. So I went ahead and ate. I did attend the meeting with the dignitaries. 43 Wheeler was confident(p) that something wasnt right, recalled Christopher Pleasant, a subsea supervisor. Wheeler couldnt believe the explanations he was hearing. But his shift was up. 44 Don Vidrine, the company man coming on the evening shift, eventually said that another negative test had to be done. 45 This time the crew members were able to get the pressure down to zero on a diverse pipe, the kill l ine, but still not for the drill pipe, which continued to show proud pressure. 46 According to BP witnesses, Anderson said he had seen this before and explained away the anomalous interpretation as the bladder effect. 47 Whether for this reason or another, the men in the shack determined that no flow from the open kill line equaled a successful negative-pressure test. 48* It was time to get on with the rest of the temporary abandonment process. Kaluza, his shift over, headed off duty. 49 At 700 p. m. , after dinner, the VIPs had gathered in the terce floor conference room with the rigs leadership. According to BPs Patrick OBryan, the Deepwater Horizon was the best performing rig that we had in our fleet and in the Gulf of Mexico.And I believe it was one of the top performing rigs in all the BP drifter fleets from the standpoint of safety and drilling performance. OBryan, at his new job just four months, was on board in part to learn what made the rig such a stand-out. 50 patron age all the crews troubles with this in style(p) well,51 they had not had a single lost-time incidental in seven years of drilling. 52 The Transocean managers discussed with their BP counterparts the bottomlog of rig maintenance. A phratry 2009 BP safety audit had produced a 30-page list of 390 items requiring 3,545 man-hours of work. 3 The managers reviewed upcoming maintenance schedules and discussed efforts to reduce dropped objects and personal injuries on a rig with exserts, multiple decks, and complicated heavy machinery, errant objects could be deadly. 54 just about 900 p. m. , Transoceans Winslow proposed they all go visit the bridge, which had not been part of their earlier tour. According to David Sims, the bridge was kind of an impressive place if you hadnt been therelots of screenslots of technology. 55 The four * The precise content of this particular conversation is disputed and is considered more in full in Chapter 4.Chapter One 7 7 men walked outside. The Gulf air was potent and the water cool off as glass. beyond the glare of the rigs lights, the night sky glimmered with stars. * * * * After concluding that the negative-pressure test was successful, the drilling crew prepared to set a cement plug56 deep in the well3,000 feet below the top of the well. 57 They reopened the blowout preventer and began pumping saltwater down the drill pipe to displace the muck up and spacer* from the riser (the pipe that connected the rig to the well assembly on the seafloor below). 8 When the spacer appeared up at the surface, they stop pumping because the fluid had to be tested to make sure it was clean enough to dump it in the Gulf, now that it had journeyed down into the well and bottom. By 915 p. m. , the crew began discharging the spacer overboard. 59 * * * * internal the bridge, Captain Kuchta welcomed visitors Sims, OBryan, Trahan, and Winslow. 60 The two dynamic-positioning officers, Yancy Keplinger and Andrea Fleytas, were also on the brid ge. 61 Keplinger was bountiful the visitors a tour of the bridge charm Fleytas was at the desk station. 2 The officers explained how the rigs thrusters kept the Deepwater Horizon in place above the well, showed off the radars and current meters, and offered to let the visiting BP men try their hands at the rigs dynamic-positioning television set simulator. 63 Winslow watched as the crew programmed in 70-knot winds and 30-foot seas, and hypothetically put two of the rigs six thrusters out of commission. thence they put the simulator into manual mode and let Sims work the hand controls to maintain the rigs location. Keplinger was advising about how much thrust to use.Winslow decided it was a good meaning to go grab a quick cup of coffee and a smoke. He walked down to the rigs gage area, poured some coffee, and lit his cigarette. 64 * * * * ranking(prenominal) Toolpusher Randy Ezell leftover the evening meeting with BP shadeing enthralld at their laudation on how good a job we had doneHow proud they were of the rig. He stopped in at the galley to get a beverage before continue to his office. At 920, he called Anderson up on the rig floor and asked, How did your negative test go? 65 Anderson It went good. . . . We bled it off. We watched it for 30 proceedings and we had no flow. Ezell What about your shift? Hows it going? Anderson Its going fine. . . . It wont be much longer and we ought to have our spacer back. * As depict more fully in Chapter 4, a spacer is a liquid that separates drilling spoil used during the drilling operations from the seawater that is pumped in to displace the mud once drilling is complete. 8 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Ezell Do you need any help from me? Anderson No, man. . . . Ive got this. . . . Go to bed. Ive got it. Ezell concluded Okay. 66 Ezell walked to his cabin. He had worked with Anderson since the rig came from the shipyard. He had complete confidence in h im. Jason was very knifelike on what he did. . . he probably had more experience as far as shutting in for kicks than any individual on the Deepwater Horizon. So Ezell prepared for bed, called his wife, and then turned off the lights to watch a bit of TV before going to sleep. 67 * * * * Up on the bridge, OBryan was taking his turn on the simulator. 68 Sims had stepped to the opposite side of the bridge when he felt up a distinct high-frequency vibration. 9 Captain Kuchta looked up and remarked Whats that? He strode to the port-side entre and opened it. 70 Outside, OBryan could see the supply vessel Bankston glistening with what looked like drilling mud. 71 The maestro shut the door and told everybody to stay inside. 72 past there began a hissing noise. 73 * * * * BPs Vidrine had headed back to his office to do paperwork. He had been there about 10 to 15 minutes when the phone rang. It was Anderson, who reported they were getting mud back and were diverting to the gas buster. Vidrine grabbed his hard hat and set out outed for the drill floor.By the time he got outside, there was mud and seawater blowing everywhere, there was a mud film on the deck. I decided not to continue and came back across. 74 * * * * Down in Ezells cabin, he was still watching TV when his phone rang. It was assistant driller Steve Curtis job, also from the rig floor. We have a situation. The well is blown out. . . . We have mud going to the crown. Ezell was horrified. Do yall have it shut in? 75 Curtis Jason is shutting it in now. . . Randy, we need your help. Ezell Steve, Ill beIll be right there. 76 He put on his coveralls, pulled his socks on, and opened the door to go across the hall to his office for his boots and hard hat. Once in the hall, a tremendous explosion blew me probably 20 feet against a bulkhead, against the wall in that office. And I remember then that the lights went out, power went out. I could hear everything deathly calm. 77 * * * * Chapter One 9 9 Up on the main deck, gantry crane hooker Micah Sandell was working with the roustabouts. I seen mud injure all the way up to the derrick. . . . then it just quit. . . I took a deep breath thinking that Oh, they got it under control. then(prenominal) all the sudden the. . . mud started coming out of the degasser. . . so strong and so loud that it just filled up the whole back deck with a gassy smoke. . . loud enough. . . its like taking an air hose and sticking it in your ear. thence something exploded. . . that started the first bring up on the point side of the derrick. 78 Sandell come outed up and turned off the crane cabs air conditioner, stressed that the gas would come in. And about that time everything in the back just exploded at one time. It. . . knocked me to the back of the cab. I fell to the floor. . put my hands over my head and I just said, No, God, no. Because I thought that was it. 79 Then the flames pulled back from his crane and began to shoot straight up, ro aring up and over the 20-story derrick. 80 * * * * Down in the engine control room, Chief Mechanic Douglas Brown, an Army veteran employed by Transocean, was filling out the nightly log and equipment hours. He had spent the day fixing a saltwater pipe in one of the pontoons. First, he detect an extremely loud air leak sound. Then a gas affright sounded, followed by more and more alarms wailing.In the midst of that noise, Brown noticed soul over the radio. I perceive the captain or chief mate, Im not sure who, make an promulgation to the standby ride, the Bankston, saying we were in a well-control situation. 81 The vessel was ordered to back off to 500 meters. 82 this instant Brown could hear the rigs engines revving. I comprehend them revving up higher and higher and higher. Next I was expecting the engine trips to take over. . . . That did not happen. After that the power went out. Seconds later, an explosion ripped through the pitch- foreboding(a) control room, outragel ing him against the control panel, blasting away the floor.Brown fell through into a subfloor full of overseas telegram trays and wires. A turn huge explosion roared through, collapsing the ceiling on him. All around in the dark he could hear people screaming and crying for help. 83 Dazed and buried in junk, he pulled himself out of the subfloor hole. In front of him appeared mike Williams, chief electronic technician, origin pour from a wound on his forehead, spook over the rubble, screaming that he had to get out. 84 * * * * Steve Bertone, the rigs chief engineer, had been in bed, reading the first destine of his book, when he noticed an odd noise. As it progressively got louder, it sounded like a incumbrance train coming through my bedroom and then there was a cluster sound that consecutively got much red-hot and with each thump, I felt the rig actually shake. 85 After a loud boom, the lights went out. 86 He leapt out of bed, opening his door to let in the emergency hall light so he could get dressed. 87 The command overhead public-address system crackled to life Fire. Fire. Fire. 88 10 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling The air smelled and tasted of some kind of fuel.A second explosion roared through, flinging Bertone across his room. He stood up, pulled on his coveralls, work boots, and hard hat, and grabbed a life vest. Out in the hall, clogged with junk from blown-out walls and ceilings, four or five men stood in shock. Bertone yelled to them to go out by the port forward or starboard forward spiral staircases and report to their emergency displace. He ran toward the bridge. 89 He went to the portside back computer, the dynamic positioning system responsible for maintaining the rigs position. I observed that we had no engines, no thrusters, no power whatsoever.I picked up the phone which was right there and I tried calling extension 2268, which is the engine control room. There was no dial t one whatsoever. It was then that Bertone looked out to the bridges starboard window. I was fully expecting to see steel and pipe and everything on the rig floor. When I looked out the window, I aphorism fire from derrick leg to derrick leg and as high as I could see. At that point, I realized that we had just had a blowout. 90 Fleytas hit the general alarm. 91 The alarm went off Report to emergency stations and lifeboats. The rig crew hear This is not a drill. This is not a drill. 92 Fleytas, realizing that the rig had not yet issued a Mayday call, sent it out. 93 Out in the dark of the Gulf, three friends on the 31-foot Ramblin clangour were out on the water for a day of tuna fishing. 94 Around 945 p. m. , Bradley Shivers trained his field glasses at a brilliant light in the distance and realized it must be an oil rig on fire. 95 On their radio, they heard, Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, this is the Deepwater Horizon. We are on fire. 96 At that moment they heard and felt a concussive sonic boom. 97 The Ramblin Wreck headed to the scene, their first tuna expedition of the year cut short. 8 Bertone was now back to his station on the bridge, thinking, The engines should be startle up because in approximately 25 to 30 seconds two engines start up, come online. . . . There was still no power of any kind. No engines starting no indication of engines starting. 99 At that moment, the water-tight door to his left banged open and he heard someone say, The engine room ECR engine control room and pump room are gone. They are all gone. Bertone turned around, What do you mean gone? The man speech production was so coated in blood Bertone had no idea who he was. Then he recognized the voice. It was Mike Williams.Bertone dictum how badly lacerated Williamss forehead was, grabbed a roll of toilet paper from the bathroom, pressed it on the wound to un curl upring the bleeding, and ordered, Hold this here. ascorbic acid Then he went back to his station and looked at his s creen. There was still nothing, no engines starting, no thrusters running, nothing. We were still a dead ship. 101 He heard the water-tight door slam again and aphorism another man soaked in blood, holding a rag to his head, repeating, Im hurt. Im hurt bad, Chief. Im hurt real bad. It was the voice of Brent Mansfield, a Transocean maritime engineer. Bertone pulled back MansfieldsChapter One 11 11 hand holding a rag, saw the head wound, and ran over to the bridge door and yelled down to the life-vessel area, We need a medic up here now. 102 * * * * After the explosion, Randy Ezell lay buried under the blown-out walls and ceilings of the toolpushers office. The room was dark and smoky, the debris atop him so heavy he could barely move. On the third try, epinephrin kicked in. I told myself, Either you get up or youre going to lay here and die. Pulling hard on his right leg, he extricated it and tried to stand up. That was the wrong thing to do because I immediately stuck my head i nto smoke. . . I dropped back down. I got on my hands and knees and for a few moments I was totally disoriented. He wondered which way the door was. He felt air. He crawled through the debris toward the door and realized the air was methane. He could feel the droplets. He was crawling slowly atop the rubble in the pitch-black hall when he felt a body. 103 Ezell then saw a bobbing beam of light. Stan Carden, the galvanic supervisor, came round the corner. Carden had a light that bounced off shattered walls and collapsed ceilings in the pitch-black corridor, self-aggrandizing glimpses into rooms on each side wrecked by the power of the blast. 04 Stumbling into what was left of the hall was Offshore Installation Manager Jimmy Harrell, who had been in the shower when the rig exploded105 he had donned coveralls, and now was groping his way out of what was left of his room. I think Ive got something in my eyes, Harrell said. He had no shoes. I got to see if I can find me some shoes. 10 6 Carden and Ezell tugged debris off the man they now recognized as Wyman Wheeler. Chad Murray, Transoceans Chief Electrician, also appeared in the hall with a flashlight, and was immediately dispatched to find a copestone for the injured man. 07 Believing it would save time to walk Wheeler out, Ezell slung Wheelers arm around his shoulder. Wheeler groaned, rigid me down . . . . Yall go on. Save yourself. 108 Ezell said, No, were not going to leave you. Were not going to leave you in here. 109 Just then, they heard another voice from under the rubble God help me. Somebody please help me. Near the ruins of the maintenance office the flashlight picked out a pair of feet jutting from the rubble. It was the visiting Transocean manager, Buddy Trahan, badly injured. By now Murray was there with a stretcher.Ezell, Carden, and Murray dragged away the remains of ceilings and walls trapping Trahan and sozzled him on the stretcher. Carden and Murray carried him through the smoke and dark t o the bow of the rig and the lifeboats. 110 Outside, the derrick fire roared upward into the night sky, an inferno throwing off searing heat and clouds of black smoke. The blinding discolour of the flames was the only illumination except for the everyday flashlight. The rigs alarms were going off, maculation over the public announcement system Keplinger yelled, THIS IS NOT A DRILL 111 As the 12National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling crew struggled out of the blasted quarters, galley, and offices, in various(a) states of undress, they converged in a chaotic and dread mass at the lifesaving vessels, putting on life vests. 112 Sandell, the gantry crane operator, had take flight and come around the port side of the deck to the life vessels. It was a lot of screaming, just a lot of screaming, a lot of hollering, a lot of panic-stricken people, including me, was scared. And trying to get people on boats. It was very unorganizedwe had some ma imed we was putting in the boat.Had people on the boat yelling, Drop the boat, drop the boat, and we still didnt have everybody on the boat yet. We was still trying to get people on the boat and trying to calm them down enough totrying to calm them down enough to get everybody on the boat. And there was people parachuting off the side. We was trying to get an accurate count and just couldnt get an accurate count because people were just jumping off the boat. 113 * * * * On the Bankston, Captain Alwin J. Landry was on the bridge updating his log when his mate noticed the mud. Landry stepped out and saw mud falling on the back half of my boat, kind of like a black rain. He called the Deepwater Horizon bridge to say, Im getting mud on me. Landry instructed his crew to get inside. The Deepwater Horizon called back and told him to move back 500 meters. 114 A crew member noticed a mud-covered seagull and egret fall to the deck. 115 curtly after, Landry saw the rig explode. Before the ship could move away, his crew had to detach the long mud transfer hose connecting them to the rig. 116 As they scrambled to disconnect, the Bankston slowly moved 100 meters back, then 500 meters. As the rig went dark, and secondary explosions rocked the decks, the Bankston turned on its searchlight.Landry could see the Deepwater Horizon crew mustering by the portside life vessels. Thats when I seen the first of three or four people jump to the water from the rig. 117 One of those was Gregory Meche, a respect specialist. After five minutes of the crazy house around the lifeboats, and a series of large explosions, he headed down to the lower deck. He jumped into the water. 118 Antonio Gervasio, the Bankstons relief chief, and two others began incoming the ships fast surrender craft. 119 Within a minute or two of the explosions, they got the boat lowered into the water, and noticed how calm the Gulf was. 20 I saw the first person jump in the water. So I told one of the guys to kee p an eye on him. 121 The rig life jackets were reflective, and as the fast craft made its first sweep round from one side of the burning rig to the other, they hauled Meche and two or three others out of the water. 122 * * * * Back on the rig, Transoceans Winslow had made his way from the coffee shop to the lifeboats, hold out the second blasts wave of concussive force, which blew in the Chapter One 13 13 corridors walls and ceilings. On the deck, a firestorm of flames roared in the night sky above the derrick. 23 Winslow directed the dazed crew toward the covered life-saving vessels, instructing the first arrivals, We need to make sure we get a good head count. Seeing Captain Kuchta standing at the starboard bridge door, he ran up, and said people should evacuate. Kuc